Hedonic prices for farmland characteristics: an analysis of farm transactions prices for Iowa by Hammes, Brian D.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
1984
Hedonic prices for farmland characteristics: an
analysis of farm transactions prices for Iowa
Brian D. Hammes
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
and the Economics Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hammes, Brian D., "Hedonic prices for farmland characteristics: an analysis of farm transactions prices for Iowa" (1984). Retrospective
Theses and Dissertations. 16526.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/16526
Redonic prices for farmland characteristics: An analysis 
of farm transactions prices for Iowa 
by 
Brian D. Hammes 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
Graduate Faculty in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree of 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
Department : Economics 
Major: Agricultural Economics 
Signatures have been redacted for privacy 
Iowa State University 
Aines, Iowa 
1984 
1193135 
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
History of Soil Erosion 
The Effects of Technological Change 
Obj ective of this Study 
Format of the Paper 
CHAPTER 2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The Land Appraisal Technique 
The Hedonic Price Technique 
CHAPTER 3. DISCUSSION OF DATA 
Comparable Workshee t 
Secondary Data 
Limitations of Data 
CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Specification of the Models 
Results 
Testing of Other Models 
CHAPTER S. CONCLUSIONS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
APPENDIX A. COMPARABLE SALE WORKSHEET 
APPENDIX B. CORRELATION MATRIX 
Page 
1 
1 
3 
s 
6 
7 
7 
10 
22 
22 
23 
24 
28 
28 
33 
38 
40 
42 
44 
45 
so 
1 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
History of Soil Erosion 
Although men first lived as hunters and foragers , there is evidence 
of cultivated agriculture in Iraq dating as far back as 11,000 B.C . 
(Braidwood and Howe, 1960). With the advent of the cultivation of land 
came the inevitable loss of soil and, hence, productivity. Civilizations 
thousands of years ago were affected by soil erosion (Lowdermilk, 1953; 
Le Houerou, 1976; and Troeh et al ., 1980) . Some of these ancient 
civilizations , cognizant of the problems caused by the excessive losses 
of soil, constructed terraces . The large amounts of labor and time 
required to form terraces are an indication of just how valuable the soil 
was considered to be . 
Leaping forwa rd in history to 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus published 
an essay on the effects of population growth . In short, the essay 
claimed that there is a natural tendency for the population to grow at a 
faster rate than the means of supporting the population . Malthus argued 
that while the population grows geometrically, the amount of agricultural 
land grows only arithmetically (Heilbroner, 1967) . He felt that the only 
constraint on the growth of population was poverty. As the population 
grew, more and more people would live their lives in poverty because of 
the limited growth in food supplies. The solution to the problem was to 
control population growth and to conserve resources including soil . 
The early settlers of the United States were not aware of this 
"natural tendency" for the population to grow fas ter than the rate of 
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subsistence. The farmers of the 1700s and 1800s saw no need to protect 
the soil from erosion. Highly erosive crops such as cotton and tobacco 
were the staple crops of the period . The continuous planting of these 
crops quickly exhausted the productivity of the soil . When the land was 
no longer productive, farmers migrated westward to fresh soils. Because 
of the excess land and the relative ease of acquiring new lands in the 
United States , there was little interest in soil erosion until the early 
1900s. Before 1930, increases in crop production had been mostly from 
the addition of land to the cropland base. However, with the ending of 
the western frontier, it became apparent that increased production would 
have to be acquired by increasing yields and using the available cropland 
more intensively . 
Because the land base has been relatively constant in recent 
decades, increasing emphasis has been placed on the available cropland. 
Over time, as the population grows and standards of living are increased, 
the demand for agricultural products increases . The human population of 
the world now consumes more food than all other land animals combined 
(Deevey, 1960). These increased demands for plant and animal products 
may make good land stewardship more crucial. 
In summary, soil erosion, and concern about soil erosion, is not a 
phenomenom unique to the 20th century. There is evidence throughout 
history that man had to deal with the issue of loss of soil . Some 
civilizations that did not address the problem ended up perishing 
(Lowdermilk, 1953) . 
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The Effects of Technological Change 
In 1928, the first estimates of soil erosion in the United States 
were published . It is not clear whether erosion rates have increased or 
decreased since then (Larson et al., 1983) . Part of this uncertainty is 
due to the inaccuracy of subsequent reports . Because of this inaccuracy, 
it is difficult to determine the effects of technological change . 
Technological change has had several effects on erosion . First , 
some advances in technology have led to increased rates of soil loss on 
farmland. The invention of the tractor led to many pastures being 
converted to cropland since the pas t ures were no longer needed to feed 
farmers ' previous source of power--horses . The increased use of tractors 
also allowed farmers to cultivate more land than they had previously been 
able to farm . The consequence of these changes has been for mo r e 
marginal and more erosive lands to enter the cropland base . The use of 
tractors also allowed for a more thorough working of the soil when 
preparing a seedbed . This has also led to higher erosion rates . 
Other technological changes have had the effect of reducing the 
rates of soil loss on farmland . For example, the construction of 
terraces results in more soil staying on the farmland instead of being 
washed away by rainfall . Another example is the arrival of conservation 
tillage . The recognition of the de t rimental soil effects of full tillage 
practices caused farmers to switch to contour tillage practices and, 
hence , reduce the erosion levels caused by cultivation of t he soil . 
The third impact of technological change causes a reduction in the 
importance of keeping the soil from eroding. The value of the topsoil is 
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diminished because advances in technology allow farmers to maintain, or 
even increase, yields even though the cropland is losing its topsoil. 
Some advances in technology include hybrid seeds and fertilizers, which 
allow greater yields per acre. Other advances have been made in areas of 
animal husbandry to reduce the feed required per animal and, therefore, 
allow the same quantity of grain to finish out a larger number of 
animals . 
If it is cheaper for farmers to adopt new technology than for them 
to try to keep the soil from eroding, then it is not surprising that 
farmers allow the "precious" topsoil to wash away. It is also relevant 
to point out that while the United States currently has about 350 million 
acres of cropland, it is very possible that the acreage base needed to 
support the population will be decreasing in the future as further 
advances in technology are made. If this is indeed true, then the most 
marginal lands will be the first to be taken out of production . Nation-
wide, only 13 percent of the farmland suffers sheet and rill erosion in 
excess of five tons per acre per year and only four percent erodes at a 
rate of over 14 tons per acre per year (U . S. D. A. , 1981) . These lands 
with a higher erosion potential will be taken out of crop production 
before the 300 million acres that are eroding at levels less than five 
tons per acre per year . 
Because the future is unforseeable, continued advances in technology 
are not guaranteed . However, even though the future is uncertain and 
different agents view the future differently, it makes little sense to 
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assume that society's view of the future is more correct than the 
farmers ' view of the future. 
Objective of this Study 
Despite all the government programs and proposals for protecting the 
soil, there is still much debate over whether government intervention is 
necessary . Is the problem of soil loss real or are people making much 
ado about nothing? After all, it is in the landowner's own interest t o 
maximize the net return of the land over the owner's lifetime. Since the 
owner may sell the land sometime in the future, it would not be expected 
that the landowner would allow the land to be farmed so extensively that 
it will lose its productive capacity. Similarly, it would be expected 
that a land purchaser would lower the bid price for reductions in 
productivity caused by soil loss . 
The objective of this study is to present econometric evidence about 
the determinants of agricultural land prices . Two sets of character-
istics , soil-topographical including topsoil depth, and locational, are 
emphasized . The null hypothesis that agricultural land prices are no t 
affected by these characteristics is tested against a sample of Iowa data 
on actual land market transactions for the years 1974-7 9. 
The empirical results presented in this study will provide evidence 
on the issue of whe t her the market places any economic weight on soil 
characte ristics that typically receive attention . The results, however, 
cannot provide evidence that land market transactions are necessarily 
conducted by rational agents since it i s not known how the 
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characteristics of land actually affect the net return to land over 
time. 
Format of the Paper 
Chapter 2 briefly discusses the land appraisal technique to give the 
reader an idea of its drawbacks and why it is not used in this study. 
The chapter then turns its focus to the procedure that will be used . The 
next chapter contains a discussion of the data used in the study. 
Chapter 4 contains the empirical models. The variables making up the 
models and the relationships between land prices and the soil 
characteristics are discussed. The final chapter contains the conclu-
sions of the study. Chapter 5 will also contain any implications for 
government policy that can be gleaned from the results. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
The Land Appraisal Technique 
The accepted method of land valuation is the land appraisal 
technique . Suter (1974) defines a farm appraisal as " • • • a definite and 
usually detailed opinion as to the value of a farm property as of a given 
date." There are three general methods of appraisal--the income, cost, 
and market approaches . 
The income capitalization, or earnings, approach values the land 
parcel from the viewpoint of its income potential . The final value is 
equal t o the summation of the annual net income stream the parcel is 
expected to produce over its lifetime discounted back to the present 
time. To use the income approach, the appraiser must estimate the yearly 
income of and expenditures on the land . This, in turn, entails 
determining cro pping patterns, estimating yields, forecasting prices for 
outputs and inputs, choosing a proper discount rate, and many other 
factors . Because the appraiser cannot foresee the future, the appraised 
value he assigns to the land is questionable, at best. For example, it 
is difficult to estimate future prices of commodities because of 
variations in such factors as weather and consumer demands. It is also 
difficult to forese e government programs, or the effects of government 
programs, such as the payment-in-kind program in 1983 . Another glaring 
problem is the choice of a discount rate, which converts the income 
stream into present value. For example, suppose there a r e two farm 
appraisers evaluating the same land parcel by the income approach. 
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Further, suppose that they agree that the annual net income per acre is 
$68. However, one appraiser uses a four percent discount rate while the 
other uses a five percent discount rate. Then, according to the 
appraiser using the four percent discount rate, the land is worth $1,700 
per acre while it is worth only $1,360 according to the appraiser using 
the five percent discount rate . As can be seen from the above two 
examples, an error in any part of the income approach can seriously 
affect the final appraised value. 
The cos t, or inventory, approach estimates the cost of replacing the 
parcel of land. The cost is associated primarily with buildings and 
improvements, and not with the land itself. If there are no buildings or 
improvements, the value of the land is the cost of replacing the land 
parcel in its unimproved state. Of the three appraisal techniques, the 
cost approach is of the least importance in farm appraisals. The reason 
for its minor importance is because building values are generally a small 
fraction of the overall land value. Of course, when appraising land that 
has a greater fraction of its value incorporated in buildings and 
improvements, the cost approach will play a more important role . 
The third, and most common, appraisal approach is the market, or 
sales comparison, approach . The market approach attempts to establish 
the price of land if sold in a free market. To do this, the land parcel 
is compared to sur rounding farmland sales and relevant market listings . 
Because of the lack of recent farm transactions, it is often necessary to 
use farms that are far from the parcel of interest and to use farm 
transactions that occurred several years ago. Even though a nearby 
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acreage is sold at the same time that the property of interest is being 
appraised, the appraised value for the property of interest is not 
necessarily equivalent to the price received for the acreage that is 
sold. Adjustments for differences in such things as crop yields and 
topsoil depth must be made before a value can be assigned t o the property 
of interest . However, the value of the property may depend on more 
abstract characteristics than crop yields and plot sizes . The appraised 
value may depend on intangible characteristics such as the location of 
the parcel relative t o a grain elevator or perhaps the opportunity to 
have a scenic view available. The main advantage of the market approach 
over the o ther two appraisal methods is that the market approach takes 
into account the nonincome characteristics of a property while the other 
two methods do not . 
While each of the three methods uses a different process to appraise 
the land, all three me thods should be used in appraising a parcel of land 
since each of the me thods assists in determining the final appraised 
value (Murray, 1969). The other advantage of using all three methods in 
each appraisal is that they act as a system of checks and balances on 
each other . For example, if the income approach appears to give too low 
of an appraised value, then the value can be adjusted upward based on the 
results of the cos t and market approaches . The market approach is 
ge nerally the appraisal t echnique that receives the most weight in 
settling on the final appraised value because it considers nonincome 
charac teristics . 
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While each of the three appraisal approaches has problems and 
drawbacks unique to the approach, the three approaches have the universal 
problem of subjectivity. Because of the subjective nature of appraisals, 
they may be systematically biased for political or other reasons (Berry 
and Bednarz, 1975) . The local assessor, who is selected by neighbors and 
friends, almost always undervalues farm and other real estate for tax 
purposes (Suter, 1974). Even if the appraiser is honest and truly 
putting forth his best effort to appraise the property, subjectivity is 
still a problem . As was s tat ed earlier, a farm appraisal is an opinion . 
The Hedonic Price Technique 
The hedonic price technique follows along the lines of the market 
value approach used by the appraiser. The primary difference between the 
two is objectivi ty versus subjectivity. The hedonic method uses quanti-
tative data and yields empirical estimates of the values of the farmland 
characteristics . The market value approach yields subjective values 
based on land transactions of similar and nearby property . Two 
appraisers can use the same data and get different results . With the 
hedonic price technique, two people using the same data will get the same 
values for farmland characteristics. The hedonic me thod helps prevent 
the bias or subjective opinions of t he researcher from entering into the 
values placed on farmland characteristics . 
The hedonic approach is a method used t o estimate the implicit 
prices of characteristics of slightly differentiated goods which belong 
to a class of products. The approach is based on the hypothesis that 
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goods are valued for their utility-bearing attributes (Rosen, 1974). 
Therefore, it attempts to value quantities of characteristics that are 
not sold directly in the market, but when aggregated, form a good that is 
sold in the market. 
The decisions of the buyers and sellers of a good can be explained 
with the help of some graphs used by Rosen (1974). Suppose we have a 
product class with the price of each good in the product class stated as 
... , x ) 
n 
where pis the price of the good and xl, x2, ••• , xn are then character-
istics of the good. The above equation simply says that the price of the 
good depends on the quantities of each of the n characteristics. 
The consumer will maximize his utility subject to his budget 
constraint. The utility function may be written as 
u U( Y, x 
1 
, x
2
, ••• , xn) 
... , X are the n characteristics of the good we are 
n 
interested in and Y is the composi te basket of all other goods consumed. 
Maximization of utility entails choosing the amounts of Y and 
xl. x2, •.•• xn given the income available to the buyer. 
Figure l shows the optimum amount of characteristic x1 to be 
purchased for the buyer to maximize his utility. The curve labeled 
* * P(X1 , x2 , •• • , Xn) shows the levels of prices the consumer must pay for 
varying quantities of the characteristic x
1
, holding constant the levels 
of all other characteristics making up the good . 
The three shorter curves, referred to as bid curves, show the prices 
the consumers are willing to pay for varying levels of the characteristic 
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P, 8 * x ) n 
. .. ' 
'i< x ) 
n 
* .. . , x ) 
n 
Figure 1. The buyer's decision 
x1 , holding constant the levels of all other characteristics . The bid 
curves are drawn concave from below because of the assumption of strict 
concavity of the utility function. Along the bid curves, the level of 
utility and the level of income are held constant . The utility received 
by a farmland purchaser must be viewed differently than the utility 
received by typical consumers. The utility an owner of farmland receives 
is in the form of profits and perhaps some more abstract means of 
satisfaction such as pride of ownership. It is unlikely that the owner 
receives direct utility from the soil characteristics that make up the 
land parcel. For example, it is doubtful that the owner receives 
satisfaction directly from one more inch of topsoil covering the 
farmland; or from a higher percent of organic matter in the plow layer. 
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However, the owner does receive utility indirectly from the soil 
characteristics since the characteristics determine the productivity and, 
in turn, the net return of the land. The farmland purchaser values an 
additional inch of topsoil in terms of its contribution to the long-run 
profitability of the land. If the additional inch of topsoil will not 
increase profits, then the purchaser will derive no utility or 
satisfactton from the inch of topsoil. To reiterate, the soil 
characteristics yield net returns which yield the buyer's utility. It is 
Ln the above context that the bid curves in Figure l are apposite. 
The figure contains three bid curves, one for each of three 
individuals. Individual three l.S willing to pay e1 for Xll amount of X1 
and for the larger amount of x
12
, he is willing to pay e
2
. However, to 
receive x11 he must pay P1 while he must pay P2 for x12 . If the marginal 
cost of the next unit of x
1 
is larger than the marginal benefit received 
from the extra unit of x
1
, then the consumer will not purchase the extra 
unit. Likewise, if the marginal benefit of the next unit is greater than 
the marginal cost that he must pay for it, then the conswner will 
purchase the additional unit of x
1
. The consumer's uti l ity is maximized 
when the marginal price of the next unit of x
1 
is equal to the marginal 
benefit received from the next unit . This occurs at the point of 
tangency between the consumer's bid curve and the curve labeled 
* * P(X
1
, x
2
, .. . , Xn). 
Turning to the production side, the producer's decision follows 
along similar lines to that of the consumer. Figure 2 shows the optimal 
dee is ion for the producer. * The curve labeled P(X
1
, X
2
, ••• J X*) 
n 
is the 
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P,Y 
.... ' * x ) n 
... ' * x ) n 
* ... ' x ) n 
Figure 2. The seller's decision 
same as that in Figure 1. The other three curves in the figure are 
defined as offer curves . An offer curve shows the amount of x1 a 
pr oducer is willing t o s upply at various prices, holding constant the 
levels of all other characteri st i cs . Along the three offer curves, one 
for each of three produce r s , the profit of the producer is being held 
constant. The offer curve s a r e drawn as being convex from below. This 
implies that the price at which a producer is willing to supply x1 is 
increasing at an increasing rate. If the assumptions are made that 
resources are scarce and that the producer of the good can i ncrease the 
amount of Xi only by using additional resources, then y must be 
increasing for all of the good ' s characteristics because of the increased 
cost of s upplying the additional amount of the characteristic, Xi . The 
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* point of tangency between the offer curve and P(X1 , x2, ... , * X ) shows n 
the amount of x
1 
a producer should offer to maximize his profits. At the 
point of tangency, the marginal revenue is equal to the marg inal cost . 
The equilibrium values for the price and quantity of characteristic 
x
1 
are located at the point of tangency between the consumer's bid curve 
and the producer ' s offer curve. In other words, equilibrium is reached 
when a seller is willing to supply an amount of x
1 
at the price which the 
buyer is willing to pay for it. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium points 
f or the three sets of producers and consumers. 
P ,e ,y 
... ' * x ) n 
Figure 3 . The equili brium points between buyers and sellers 
* The price function, P(X
1
, x
2
, ... ' * X ) , can be thought of as being n 
comprised of an infinite number of points of tangency between an offer 
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curve and a bid curve. While the price function can be concave or convex 
from below, it is intuitively correct to draw it as being concave from 
below. If the curve was drawn as being convex from below, this would 
imply that an individual starting at a higher level of x
1 
will have a 
higher marginal willingness to pay for one more unit of x1 than that of 
an individual starting at a lower level of x
1
• By assuming the price 
function is concave from below, a more reasonable alternative is 
presented. Then it is assumed that a person starting at a lower level of 
x
1 
is willing to pay more for an additional unit of x
1 
than is a person 
starting at a higher level of x1• 
Because of the limitations of graphs, the above analysis has been 
done in terms of a single characteristic of the good. The analysis can 
be extended to all characteristics by visualizing a separate plane for 
each of the n characteristics of the good. For the consumer, there will 
be optimal amounts the consumer should purchase of each of the character-
istics to maximize his utility. Likewise, there will be optimal amounts 
the producer should supply to maximize profits. Equilibrium occurs when 
the supply of each characteristic is perfectly met by the demand for each 
characteristic. At this point, the good will change hands between the 
producer and consumer. 
The use of the hedonic price technique to value the separate charac-
teristics of a good is relatively new. The theory of the approach was 
laid out by Griliches (1971), Rosen (1974), and Lucas (1975) . The most 
common area of application in which the hedonic approach has been used is 
the urban housing market (Goodman, 1978; Linneman, 1980). Houses can be 
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differentiated by number of square feet, number of rooms, proximity to 
shopping centers, and so forth. If the price equation is stated as 
P = P(X
1
, x
2
, .. . , Xn) 
where Pis the price of the house and x
1
, x
2
, ... , X
0 
are the character-
istics of the house, then the implicit price of each characteristic can 
be calculated. For example, if x1 is the number of bedrooms of the 
house. then 'CJP/ axl = p 1 (Xl. x2' ... ' XO) gives the implicit price that 
the home buyer would place on one more bedroom. The hedonic technique 
has also been used to rank ci ties by quality of life (Roback, 1982) and 
to calculate housing prices and the demand for clean air (Harrison and 
Rubinfeld, 1978). Use of the hedonic approach in the area of farmland 
values has been very limited. 
Certain assumptions must be made before the hedonic method can be 
properly utilized. The first of these assumptions is that the area, in 
this case the state of Iowa, can be considered a single market. Embedded 
in this assumption is the assumption that all individuals have informa-
tion on all goods in the market. These assumptions assure that all 
individuals have knowledge of all options available to them. The 
consumers have information about the various packages of characteristics 
and, henc e, are able to maximize their utility. The sellers know that 
there are individuals willing t o pay various amounts for the different 
packages of characteristics and, hence, the sellers are able to max1m1ze 
their profits . 
As support for the argume nt of treating Iowa as a single land 
market, an unpublished study along similar lines as this one regressed 
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county farmland prices against land characteristics (Miranowski, 1983) . 
Dummy variables were included for different regions of the state, but the 
dummy variables were not statistically significant. This lends credence 
to the assumption that the base price of farmland is the same throughout 
Iowa . If market segmentation does exist, then the hedonic price function 
estimated for the state as a whole will provide incorrect estimates of 
the implicit prices of farmland characteristics. 
It must also be assumed that the land market is in equilibrium. The 
demand for goods with the specific levels of x1 , x2 , 
equal to the supply of goods with those attributes. 
• •• , X must be n 
Along the price 
function , P(X1 , x2 , ••• , Xn), the quantity demanded is equal to the 
quantity supplied . In other words, the price must clear the market for 
each bundle of characteristics. If the market is in equilibrium, this 
means that each individual has made the decision that will maximize his 
utility given the alternate land parcels (Freeman, 1979). 
A final assumption is that there must be a large number of available 
properties having different levels of characteristics from which the land 
purchaser may choose. This will allow the buyer to find an acreage which 
will fit his preference pattern and allow him to maximize his utility . 
Freeman (1979) compares this to thinking of the market as a huge 
supermarket offering the characteristics xl, x2, • • • • xn packaged in 
various combinations. There must be a sufficient number of combinations 
to allow the consumer to purchase the combination from which he will 
derive the most satisfaction. 
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Given the above assumptions, the general price equation used in this 
study can be expressed as 
P = P(X, L) (1) 
where Pis the price of farmland per acre, Xis a vector of soil 
characteristics of the farmland, and L is a vector of the locational 
characteristics. Since the study attempts to explain differences in the 
values of properties available to the same set of buyers, the investiga-
tion is done in terms of differences in the characteristics of the 
properties rather than in terms of differences in the characteristics of 
the purchasers. 
The partial derivative of farmland price with respect to a 
characteristic gives the marginal implicit price of that characteristic, 
i.e., the additional amount that a purchaser must pay to move to a bundle 
with one more unit of that characteristic, holding all other things 
constant. If equation (1) is linear, the the marginal implicit price of 
the characteristic is a constant . If this is the case, then for an extra 
unit of the char acteristic, he is always willing to pay a fixed amount. 
The amount he is willing to pay is not dependent upon whether the 
purchaser originally has a small quantity or a large quantity of the 
characteristic . If equation (1) is nonlinear, then the marginal implicit 
price of a characteristic is not constant, but instead will depend on its 
quantity and possibly the quantities of other characteristics. For 
example, suppose that it is determined that an interaction term between 
topsoil depth and the percent of organic matter in the plow layer has an 
effect on the farmland price. Then, the marginal implicit price for an 
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inch of topsoil is also dependent on the percent of organic matter that 
is present. As can be seen, the functional form used has important 
effects on the implicit prices of the characteristics . By starting with 
a specific functional form , certain a priori assumptions are made about 
the implicit prices. If there are no grounds or theore tical bases to 
start with a specific form, then to do so may lead to incorrect conclu-
sions . To pick on one form in particular, linearity will occur only if 
consumers can untie and repackage bundles of attributes (Rosen, 1974) . 
If repackaging is not possible, then equation (1) will be nonlinear. 
Freeman (1979) gives the example of two living rooms with six-foot 
ceilings not being equal to one living room with a 12-foot ceiling . 
Using an example that is more relevant to this study, suppose there are 
two 80-acre plots. On one plot, the topsoil is 12 inches deep. On the 
other, the topsoil is 24 inches deep on 40 acres and there is no topsoil 
on the other 40 acres, giving an average topsoil depth of 12 inches. If 
the buyer is indifferent between owning the two parcels, then linearity 
occurs . 
Because the author has no a priori hypothesis on whether the buyer 
would be indifferent between the two plots and because most of the 
empirical studies using hedonic models have found nonlinear forms to give 
more satisfactory econometric results, the Box-Cox procedure will be used 
(Box and Cox, 1964). The Box-Cox methodology will rid the study of 
subjective beliefs about the proper functional form. This approach uses 
an iterative process to find the proper transformations of the data which 
will maximize the likelihood estimate . Likelihood ratio tests can then 
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be used to test the appropriateness of alternative functional forms for 
the price equation. 
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CHAPTER 3. DISCUSSION OF DATA 
Comparable Worksheet 
The data used in this analysis are for individual land transactions 
within Iowa. These data were gathered by students in Economics 440, Real 
Estate Appraisal, during the spring quarters of 1978 and 1979 at Iowa 
State University. As part of the coursework, each student was required 
to conduct a farm appraisal based on nearby farms and recent farm 
transactions . Comparable worksheets were used by the students to assist 
in carrying out the appraisal. Some of the data contained in these 
comparable worksheets are used in this study. Appendix A has a copy of 
the worksheet. 
The comparable worksheet is broken into five sections. Section I 
contains transfer information. In this section, the piece of information 
of the most importance is the legal description. From section II, the 
sale price per acre is acquired. Section III contains assessment and tax 
information. The assessed value of buildings and the tax levy are of 
particular importance in this section . The characteristics of the farm 
make up section IV. Many potential characteristics that may be of use in 
explaining the sale price of farmland are contained in section IV. 
Section V contains the characteristics of the buyer. As stated in 
Chapter 2, the characteristics of the buyer are not relevant to this 
study since this thesis is an attempt to explain differences in the 
values of properties available to the same set of buyers. 
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Secondary Data 
While the comparable worksheets contain important data, they are 
devoid of information about the soil properties of the farmland. It is 
to be expected that soil characteristics , such as topsoil depth and the 
percent organic matter, may be important factors in determining the sale 
price of the land . To remedy the problem, soil characteristic variables 
are created with the aid of soil maps and the legal descriptions 
contained in section I of the wor ksheets . Once the land parcel is 
identified on the soil map, the percent of each soil type in t he plot can 
be calculat ed. By knowing the percent of each soil type in the l and 
parcel, soil variables can be created since each soil has certain 
characteristics . For example , Webste r soil has a topsoil 18 inches deep 
and 6 .0-7. 0 percent organic matter content in the plow layer. Once the 
percent of soil type in a parcel i s known, the soil var iables are created 
by weighting each soil type ' s values by the percent of that particular 
soi l type in the property . Variabl es for topsoil depth, percent or gan i c 
matter in the plow l ayer, availabl e water capacity, and pH were fo r med in 
this manner. 
The soil survey reports used to create soil variables are available 
for only about 70 out of the 99 counties in I owa requiring that some 
observations be dropped . Obse rvations were also deleted for other 
reasons including incomplete data, inaccurate data, and sales transa ct ion 
occurring before 1974 . After all the deletions, the da ta set consisted 
of 94 observations . These observations were from transactions occurring 
in 1974 through 1979 . 
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Since the data va ry over years, the land prices must be converted to 
the price levels of a certain year t o rid the prices of inf lationar y 
effects. The county average farmland price per acre for years 1974 
through 1979 from the Iowa Land Value Survey (Harris e t al ., 1980) was 
used to convert all l and prices to 1978 dollars. Table 1 contains 
summary statistics for the data from the comparable worksheets and the 
data that were created from the soil maps and legal descriptions. 
Limitations of Data 
As with all data, t her e are certain drawbacks and faults. Because 
of the time and effort required to fully complete the worksheets, some 
students we re unable t o complete the workshee t. It is nearly impossible 
t o determine the accuracy of r e porting on the worksheets, so it is 
assumed that the data a re accurately reported . 
The most impor tant limitation of the data set is tha t it is not a 
random sample . Because the s t udents in Economics 440 were not randomly 
drawn from across the state nor were their observations, it is 
unreasonable to expect the data set to be random . Figure 4 shows the 
number of o bservations in each county . A large number of observations 
are found in central Iowa . Table 2 shows the freque ncy of o bservations 
by price-reporting districts in Iowa . As can be seen , over half the 
o bservations are in the North Central District. 
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Table 2. Frequency of observations by pr ice-reporting district 
Price - reporting district 
Northwest 
North Central 
Northeast 
Sout hwest 
South Central 
Southeast 
Num her of farms 
6 
51 
10 
13 
9 
s 
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CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In this cha pter, the empirical models used 1n this study are 
presented. The mod e ls are set up as variations of Box-Cox regressions . 
The most general form of the quadratic Box-Cox model can be written as 
p e = Clo + I: al. z ~ + .! I: I: y. . z ~ z ~ 
1 2 1J 1 J 
1 1 j 
where it is assumed that y . . = y .. to reduce the identification problem. 
1J J 1 
The general Box-Cox functional form includes interaction terms between 
all variables making up the model. Because of problems such as multi-
collinearity and 1 imi ted degrees of freedom, the most general flexible 
functional form was not considered . In stead, if a theoretical argument 
could be made for interacting two variables, then the interaction term 
was included in the model. A correlation matrix is reported in 
Appendix Band shows that some variables are very highly correlated. 
Specification of the Models 
In this thesis, two ma i n models will be presented. The first of 
these mode ls can be expressed as 
>. >.2 >.2 
PRACRE78 l - 1 
ao + l3 [SOILDEP - 1 l3 [PH - 11 = 1 + >.l 1 >.2 2 >.2 
>.2 
- 1 
;\.2 
- 11 l3 [BLDVAL78 l3 [DEPRKLS 
+ 3 ;\. ] + 4 ;\.2 2 
(2) 
where 
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PRACRE78 is the price per acre of farmland converted to 1978 
dollars; 
SOILDEP is the depth, in inches, of the topsoil; 
PR is the pH level of the soil; 
BLDVAL78 is the assessed dollar value of buildings per acre 
converted to 1978 dollars; 
SW is a dummy variable fo r a region of the state , equal to one if 
the transaction occurred in the southwest region of Iowa, 
otherwise it is equal to zero; 
NE is a dummy variable for a region of the state, equal to one if 
the transaction occurred in the northeast region of Iowa, 
otherwise it is equal to zero; 
NC is a dummy variable for a region of the state, equal to one if 
the transaction occurred in the north central region of Iowa, 
otherwise it is equal to zero; 
NW is a dummy variable for a reg ion of the state , equal to one if 
the transaction occurred in the northwest region of Iowa, 
otherwise it is equal to zero; and 
DEPRLKS is an interaction between SOILDEP and RKLS. 
The variable, RKLS, is a measure of the potential erosivity of the 
soil. It is a portion of the Universal Soil Loss Equat i on (USLE) 
developed by Wischmeir and Smith (1968) . The USLE estimates the average 
amount of soil detached and transported from a field over the period of 
one year. The equation is: 
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A R • K • L • S • C • P 
where 
A average gr oss soil loss (tons per acre), 
R rainfall-and-runoff factor, 
K = soil-erodibility factor, 
L slope-length factor, 
S slope-gradient factor, 
C = cropping-management factor, and 
P erosion-control and support-practice factor. 
The product, R • K • L • S, is the predicted average soil loss from 
a continuously fallow field which is tilled. 
The model is written in the nomenclature of a Box-Cox equation. 
From this general form, many functional forms can be derived . For 
example, if Al= A2 = l, then the model reduces to a more common linear 
statistical model. If Al = A2 = 0, then the model becomes a model of the 
log-log form. 
1 As one last example, if Al = A2 = 2 , then the model takes 
on the form of a square-root model . 
The first independent variable, SOILDEP, is one that may be very 
useful in helping to answer the question of whether farmland buyers 
recognize the detrimental effects of soil loss on productivity. The 
expected sign of the estimated coefficient is positive. If this proves 
to be correct, then it would lend support to the argument that farmers 
place a higher value on land with more topsoil than they place on land 
with less topsoil, holding all other things constant . 
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The second independent variable is soil pH. For most crops, there 
is a desirable pH range for the land to be at its most productive level . 
If the pH is below this range, then it is expected that the land 
purchaser will pay more for a higher pH level. If the pH is above this 
range, then the l and purchaser will reduce the price he is willing to pay 
for the property . 
The third independent variable, BLDVAL78, is included in the 
equation so that it may be held constant when calculating the marginal 
implicit prices of the other variables. If the value of the buildings 
was not included, then the marginal implicit prices of other variables 
may be biased . For example, if building values are not included, the 
marginal implicit price of an inch of topsoil may be measuring not only 
the value of the topsoil, but may also be including the value of the 
buildings. This would place a higher value on an additional inch of 
topsoil than land purchasers do in a free market . It is expected that 
BLDVAL78 will have a positive sign on its estimated coefficient . If the 
assessed building value approximates the value that the land purchaser 
places on the building, then the estimated coefficient should have a 
value near one. If the estimated coefficient is not close to one, then 
this would indicate that the assessed value is not an accurate measure of 
the value assigned in the marketplace . 
The coefficient of the interaction term between SOILDEP and RKLS is 
hypothesized to have a negative sign . If the sign turned out to be 
positive, this would imply that, holding topsoil depth constant, as the 
potential erosivity increases , the buyer is willing to pay more for the 
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parcel of land. If the sign is negative, then the farmland buyer pays 
less for land that is potentially more erosive than for land that is less 
susceptible to erosion . 
The dummy variables for the regions of Iowa are not written in Box-
Cox form. The reason for this is because the dlmUily variables only shift 
the intercept para.me ter up or down. '111ey do not affect the slope 
parameters. The dlmUily variables are included to determine if there are 
any differences in the base prices for different regions of Iowa. If 
they are no t significantly different from zero, this supports the 
assumption of treating the state as a single market for farmland. 
The second model to be tested and reported is a variation of the 
first. The model is written as: 
where 
;\ 
LANDPR78 l - 1 
.Al = aO + 
;\ 
[ SOILDEP 
2 
- 1 
al .A ] + 
2 
;\ 
PH 2 - l 
a2 [ A ] 
2 
(3) 
LANDPR78 is the price per acre at the time of the transaction minus 
the assessed building value per acre multiplied by the county 
land value for 1978 divided by the county land value in the 
year of the transaction . 
All other variables are the same as in model 1 . 
In model 2, the assessed building value is subtracted out before the 
regression is run . In contrast, model 1 explicitly takes account of 
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buildings by including a variable for assessed building value on the 
right-hand side of the equation . The other difference is the dummy 
variables are not included in model 2. The independent variables are 
expec t ed to have the same signs as were hypothesized for model 1. 
Results 
Model 1 wi l l be discussed first and then attention will be directed 
to model 2 . Model 1 has three variants . In model l .a, only the indepen-
dent variable was transformed. All of the independent variables were 
restricted to the linear form . In model l.b, the independent variables 
were transformed , but the dependent variable was not . Even though the 
independent variables were allowed to change , they were restricted to the 
same transformation. In model l . c, all variables were subject to the 
same transformation . The regression results for the three variants are 
shown in Table 3. 
All of the parameters have the hypothesized signs with the exception 
of the dummy variables for which no a priori signs were hypothesized . In 
all three equations, the coefficients of SOILDEP and DEPRKLS are 
statistically significant at the five percent significance level while 
the coefficient of BLDVAL78 is statistically significant at the one 
percent significance level . The coefficient of PR is significant at the 
five percent level in two equations and significant at the one percent 
level in one equation . The dummy variables in model 1 are never 
statistically different from zero at a ten percent level of significance . 
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Therefore, it is not unreasonable to treat Iowa as a single farmland 
market. 
Table 4 contains the marginal implicit prices of the variables 
evaluated at their means for model 1. The measures of soil loss and 
potential soil loss, SOILDEP and RKLS, appear to be very consistent 
across models l.a and l.c. Even though the values in model l .b do not 
totally agree with those of models l . a and l.c, the discrepancy is not 
large. As the table indicates, land buyers will pay more for additional 
topsoil and less if the land is potentially erosive. The marginal 
implicit price for SOILDEP in model l.a is interpreted as meaning a 
purchaser would value the marginal inch of topsoil at $17.49. 
Table 4. Marginal implicit prices for model 1 
Model l . a 
Model 1. b 
Model l.c 
SOILDEP 
17 . 49 
23 . 45 
18. 37 
PH 
552 . 69 
589.53 
538 .7 2 
BLDVAL78 
1.22 
• 70 
1.17 
RKLS 
-3.89 
-2.52 
-3.64 
It is interes ting to note that the variable for assessed building 
value is always significantly different from zero at a one percent level 
of significance. This implies that farmers consider buildings to be 
important in determining farmland values. If the land purchaser values 
the buildings the same as assessors do, then the marginal implicit price 
for buildings should be one. Models l.a and l.c imply that farmland 
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purchasers place a higher value on buildings than assessors while 
model l.b implies that buyers place a lower value on buildings than 
assessors. It is difficult to determine which case more accurately 
reflects reality. 
Turning to model 2, it has three variants in the same format as 
those of model 1. Even though model 2 has only three independent 
variables, a large fraction of the variance of farmland prices is 
explained. The regression results for model 2 are displayed in Table 5. 
The coefficient of the interaction term between topsoil depth and RKLS is 
statistically significant at the one percent level in all three variants 
of model 2 . The coefficients of SOILDEP and PH are significant at the 
Table 5. Results of model 2 
Estimated coefficientsa Box-Cox 
R2 
regression 
Model SOILDEP PH DEPRKLS Intercept for >. 
2.a 2. 854** 48.895** -.036** -113.550 .402 .67 
(1.065) (16.115) (. 007) (108.75) 
2.b 40.879* 654.350** -.749** -1,588 .300 . 380 . 91 
(16.012) (229.94) (.153) (1,187.800) 
2.c 8.333** 103.880* -.353** -128.63 .398 • 72 
(3.181) (41.143) ( .068) (170.37) 
astandard error s in parentheses . 
*Statistically significant at five percent level. 
**Statistically significant at one percent level. 
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one percent level in two variants and significant at the five percent 
level in one variant . Model 2. a performs especially well with all 
variables significant at the one percent level and an R-square of . 402 . 
The marginal implicit price of the variables comprising model 2 are 
shown in Table 6 . The pH variable is consistent across the three models 
Table 6 . Marginal implicit prices for model 2 
Model 2 . a 
Model 2.b 
Model 2 . c 
SOILDEP 
11.89 
10 .27 
7 . 77 
PH 
591.45 
551 . 65 
506 . 37 
RKLS 
- 6 .12 
-5.94 
-6.80 
and compares favorably with the values in Table 4 . Tur ning to the other 
two variables, the marginal implicit price for RKLS is consistent across 
the variants of model 2, but are about three dollars higher than those of 
model 1. The marginal implicit price for an inch of topsoil varies from 
$7.77 to $11 . 89 and averages about ten dollars less than the marginal 
implicit prices of model 1. Even tho ugh the marginal implicit price for 
an inch of topsoil varies from a high of $23.45 in model l.b t o a l ow of 
$7 . 77 in model 2 . c, both models support the hypothesis that farmers will 
pay more for additional topsoil. 
As was stated in Chapter 3, the data set is nonrandom . This may 
cause the marginal implicit prices of the variables to be biased. The 
impact the high number of observations in northcentral Iowa has on the 
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marginal implicit prices depends on the differences of soil 
characteristics between northcentral Iowa and the rest of the state--the 
larger the differences, the gerater the bias in the marginal implicit 
prices . The average topsoil depth for the observations in northcentral 
Iowa is 15.2 inches while the average is 12.9 inches for the observations 
in the rest of the state. Since northcentral Iowa is overrepresented in 
the data set, it is expected that the marginal implicit price of an inch 
of topsoil is biased downward. In other words, if the data set consisted 
of o bservations scattered randomly throughout Iowa, the value would be 
higher than the models indicate. Simi larly, RKLS has a much lower value 
for the o bservations in the northcentral region. Therefore, if the 
observations were random, then land purchasers would consider the 
potential e rosion of the property to be more important than the models 
indicate . 
Testing of Other Models 
Models were estimated with other variables included. Some of the 
variables included were distance from farmland to marketing center, 
available water capacity in the top 60 inches, a squared term for the 
topsoil depth, percent of organic matter in the plow layer, the county 
tax levy, dummy variables for the amount of tiling , and dummy variables 
for the type of road surface next to the farmland. 
Surprisingly, the distance from the acquisition to the nearest 
marketing center was not statistically significant in any of the models. 
The same is true for available water capacity. There are two probable 
39 
reasons why available water capacity is not significant . First, Iowa 
usually receives a quite adequate supply of rainfall. Second, there is 
little variation in the available water capacity variable . 
When the topsoil depth is squared and included in the model, it is 
not s t atistically significant. This is probably due to the data set 
having an average topsoil depth of 14.20 inches and a minimum topsoil 
depth of 6.05 inches. The squared term would probably be significant 
only if there was a large number of land parcels with a topsoil depth 
less than five inches. 
The organic matter variable came in significantly when topsoil depth 
was excluded from the model, but was not significant if topsoil depth was 
included. The correlation matrix of Appendix B shows a high positive 
correlation between organic matter and soil depth and negatively between 
organi c matter and RKLS . The soil depth variable and the erosivi t y 
variable are good proxies for the percent of organic matter in the plow 
layer . 
The tax levy level , tiling dummies, and road surface dummies were 
not statistically significant in any models. The probable reason for the 
tiling dummies not contributing to the explanation of the price of land 
is because most land that requires drainage has already been tiled in 
Iowa . 
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has presented econometric evidence that soil character-
istics of farmland are reflected in land prices. The regressors, 
including a variable measuring topsoil depth and an interaction term 
composed of topsoil depth and erosivity potential, had significant 
coefficients with correct signs. The empirical models, which differed in 
functional form, provided estimates of the marginal value of an 
additional inch of topsoil that ranged from a low of $7.77 per acre to a 
high of $23.45 per acre. The estimates of the marginal value of a one 
ton per acre reduction in the erosion potential ranged from $2.52 to 
$6.80 . Thus, the results suggest that both buyers and sellers of 
farmland value important soil characteristics . There is a positive gross 
return from protecting farmland from erosion. 
It has been shown that farmers lower the value of the land for soil 
erosion . However, it is difficult to ascertain whether farmers are 
discounting the value of the land sufficiently to account for the loss of 
productive capacity. As was mentioned earlier, it is not known how the 
charateristics actually affect the net return to land over time. This 
brings up another issue. Even if farmers were not valuing topsoil 
correctly, is it necessarily correct to assume that policymakers and 
society have better information than farmers about the value that should 
be placed on topsoil and reductions in erosivity? Farmers have the most 
to lose by not valuing land correctly, so it would seem that they would 
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have a stronger incentive to understand the impacts of soil loss than 
would policymakers . 
The results of thi s study cannot be interpreted as implying that 
there s hould be no government programs to help control soil losses. 
Perhaps, exis ting government programs have caused farmers to recognize 
the detrimental effects of excessive soil loss . Further studies need to 
be undertaken to determine the effects of present government programs on 
the attitudes of farmers concerning soil erosion and if these attitudes 
would change in the absence of the present programs. 
It is also important to note that this study focused on soil erosion 
as it affects the productivity of the land . Even though farmers recog-
nize the effects of soil loss, governmental programs may still be 
desirable . Off-fa rm costs and environmental damages incurred by other 
people as a resul t of the erosion were not considered in this study . 
These costs are borne by other people and not the farmers . Therefore, 
farmers have little incentive to reduce erosion to prevent these damages . 
Perhaps, government programs should not be designed to protect the 
productivity of the land. Instead, government programs may be more 
socially beneficial if they are designed to reduce the damages done to 
the environment by erosion . 
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COMPARABLE SALE WORKSHEET 
Comparable Sale # 
~~~~------~ 
Student Name 
~------~ 
I. TRANSFER INFORMATION (AUDITOR' S OFF ICE) 
A. Seller (Grantor): B. Buyer (Grantee): 
C. Date of Instrument: D. Number of Acres: 
E. County: Township: Nearest Town: 
F. Legal Description: 
II. SALE PRICE INFORMATION (RECORDER'S OFFICE) 
A. Deed Book (Verify Legal Description) 
1 . Consideration Shown: $ 2. Date of Deed: 
B. 
---
3 . Stamp Tax: $ 
-~~~~~~~ 
4. Other (e.g ., assumed 
mortgage): 
Mortgage and Contract Book 
l . Type of Financing (Check One): Mortgage Contract __ , 
2. Date of Mort age or Contract: 
3 . Downpayment : $ 
4. Amount of Mortgage or Contract: $ 
S. Interest Rate: % ---
6. Term: _____ years 
7 . Payment Pattern 
a. Periodic Payments: $ -------
b. Balloon Payment: $ -------
c. Sale Price Verification 
1 . Verification by: Date: Place: 
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Comparable Sale # Student Name 
----------~ 
2. Consideration Paid: $ 
-------~ 
3. Per Acre Value: $ 
---------~ 
III . ASSESSMENT AND TAX INFORMATION (ASSESSOR'S AND TREASURER'S OFFICE) 
A. Date of Assessment: 
B. Assessed Value 
1. Land: $ 2 . Buildings ---- ---~ 3. Total $ ----
C. Tax Levy: $ /thousand ----
D. Total Taxes: $ E. Taxes Per Acre: $ ------ -----
IV. CHARACTERISTICS OF FARM (ASSESSOR ' S OFFICE AND OTHER) 
A. Location : 
1. Distance to Nearest Farm Supply and Market Center: 
miles 
2 . Road Surface (Check One) : County Gravel __ , 
County Blacktop ; State Highway Federal Highway 
B. Productivity (Under Highest and Best Use): 
1. Number of Tillable Acres: 
2. Number of Acres in Permanent Pasture : 
3 . Number of Acres in Waste and Farmstead: 
4 . Total Farm Average CSR: 
s. Tillable Acres Average CSR: 
6 . Total Farm Average Corn Yield: 
7 • Tillable Acres Average Corn Yield : 
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Student Name Comparable Sale # 
~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~-
C. Buildings and Improvements: 
1. Buildings Condition (Check One): Obsolete Poor 
Average ; Above Average Excellent --- ---
2 . Specialized Facilities (Check Where Appropriate): 
Confinement Hog Operation ---
Confinement Cattle Operation ---
Harvestor Silo(s) 
Other (Describe) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
3 . Terraces (Check One): None __ , Some __ , Extensive 
4. Tiling (Check One): None Some 
V. CHARACTERISTICS OF BUYER 
A. Form of Ownership (Check One): Owner-Operator 
Local Landlord ; Absentee Landlord ---
B. Type of Organization (Check One): 
1. Single Proprietor ---
Extensive 
---
2. Partnership Number of Owner-Operators ---
3. Family Corporation Number of Owner-Operators 
4. Other Corporation ---
c. Size of Operation Before Acquistion (If Owner-Operator): 
1. Number of Acres Owned: 
2. Number of Acres Rented-In: 
3. Number of Tractors (over 20hp) Owned: 
a. Horsepower: 
b. Age: 
---
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Student Name Comparable Sale # 
~---------~ -------~ 
4. Number of Self-Propelled Combines: 
a. Number of Rows on Corn Head: 
b. Age: 
D. Location of Buyer (If Owner-Operator): 
1. Distance from Farm Base to New Acquisition: miles 
E. Personal Characteristics of Buyer at Time of Acquisition (If 
Owner-Operated): 
1. Number of Years Farming of Owner-Operator(s): _____ _ 
2. Highest Year of School Completed of Owner-Operator(s): 
3. Number of Anticipated Owner-Operators to Join Farming Unit 
During Next Five Years: 
4 . Amount of Off-Farm Income of Owner - Operator(s) and 
Family(ies) (Check One): None $1 -$5 , 000 ---
$5,001-$10,000 ; $10,001-$15,000 ---
$15 ,000 and above ---
5 . Amount of Net Worth of Owner-Operator(s ) and Family(ies) 
(Check One): $0-$50,000 ; $50,001-$100,000 ---
$100,001-$150,000 $150,001-$200,000 ---
$200,001 and above ---
VI . COMMENTS : 
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APPENDIX B. CORRELATION MATRIX 
Ta ble B.l . Corr e l ation matrix 
PRACRE78 MRKTDIST TOTYIELD TILYIELD TAX.LEVY TILLCSR TOTCSR 
PRACRE7 8 
MRKTDIST 
TOTYIELD 
TILYI ELD 
TAX.LEVY 
TILLCSR 
TOTCSR 
SOILDEP 
RKLS 
OM 
AWC 
PH 
BLDVAL78 
LANDPR78 
1. 0000 - 0 . 1678 
1 . 0000 
0 . 4815 
-0 . 2679 
1. 0000 
0 . 1962 
- 0.0879 
0 . 5767 
1. 0000 
-0 . 1525 0 . 3276 0 . 5028 
0 . 0817 - 0.1761 -0 . 1513 
-0 . 2647 0 . 5850 0 . 7 837 
-0 . 0589 0 .6356 0 . 6296 
1.0000 - 0 . 0298 - 0 . 2708 
1. 0000 0 . 8300 
1.0000 
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SOILDEP RKLS OM AWC PH BLDVAL78 LANDPR78 
0 . 2584 -0 . 5115 0 . 5482 -0 . 1064 0 . 3305 0 . 0222 0 . 9542 
- 0 . 2233 0 . 0907 -0 .1 106 -0 . 2704 - 0 . 1157 0 . 0732 -0 .1686 
0 . 2218 - 0 . 5049 0 . 4824 0 . 05 18 0.0844 -0 . 1995 0 . 4500 
0 . 0667 -0 . 2187 0 . 1318 -0 . 0058 -0 . 1304 -0.0307 0 . 1033 
- 0 . 1416 0.1601 -0 . 2374 - 0 . 1065 - 0 . 2218 0 . 1321 -0 . 1878 
0 . 067 1 -0 . 0470 0 .1070 0 . 1260 - 0 . 007 6 -0 . 0847 0 . 3579 
0 . 3354 -0 . 3178 0 . 4002 0 . 3708 0 . 0709 - 0 .1248 0 . 5327 
1. 0000 -0 . 3619 0 . 3847 0 . 06 15 0 . 0521 -0 . 0829 0 . 2840 
1. 0000 - 0 . 837 6 0 . 3067 -0 . 3428 0.3390 -0 . 5970 
1.0000 - 0 . 2301 0 . 5560 - 0 . 17 63 0 . 5926 
1. 0000 -0 . 2286 0 .1869 -0 .1 392 
1. 0000 -0 . 2431 0 . 4178 
1 . 0000 -0 . 2749 
1 . 0000 
